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The last decade brought about a massive increase in scope and 
discretion for the local government policy-making in the post-communist 
countries. The revenue collection was partly decentralized, transferring to 
the local units the responsibility for funding themselves. On the expenditure 
side, a lot of attributions were devolved from the center to the local 
governments, from supporting education and health care to subsidizing the 
local public services (if they chose, or can afford, to do so). As the reform in 
the post-communist countries advances, it seems likely that the welfare 
state will also become more localized. Decentralization of resources will 
create regional disbalance, the needs will be more variable and services 
more specialized, therefore the growth of local service provision will be a 
major trend in the modern, democratic societies that the CEE countries are 
trying to build.  
But although decentralization and local government empowerment 
were proclaimed major political objectives, few studies have been pursued 
in our region which attempt to explain the differences in performance among 
the sub-national units, within or across countries. (For exceptions, see Bird, 
Ebel and Wallich, 1995; Swianiewicz, Blaas, Illner and Peteri, 1996). Which 
is surprising, given the practical relevance of the topic and the fact that 
these differences are sometimes striking. Such studies can discern what are 
the factors that determine the direction and the success or failure of the 
local policies: the economic environment, political affiliation of the local 
policy-makers, political culture – or none of these? Even an answer of the 
latter sort is important because it may imply the optimistic conclusion that 
other elements, like personal skill and determination of the political actors, 
play a role, thus allowing for interventions which can improve things quickly.  
 This study attempts at revealing the way the Romanian mayors 
reacted to the major reform of the local administration initiated by the 
government in 1998-19991. Our aim is to explore what are the attitudes and 
                                         
1 A substantial decentralization in both attributions and resources was realized, together with 
a reduction in the centrally administered grants and ear-marked funds. Local governments 
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values of this important sub-class of political actors, and what are their 
strategies for coping with the new situation. We believe, following the ‘new 
institutionalist’ paradigm, that the frames of mind of the social agents are 
part of the institutional framework in a broader sense, because they filter 
and rationalize the surrounding reality. By doing so, they shape the behavior 
of the agents which in turn will influence this very reality (North, 1990).  
The field research was conducted in May-July 1999 on a sample of 
600 Romanian local governments (a representative sample of the whole lot 
of 2,948 municipalities in Romania). The data was collected through a self-
administered questionnaire sent by mail to the mayors in two rounds: the 
first set was distributed in May-June; the second set was sent only to the 
mayors who had not responded to the first call. Due to the official backing 
and co-operation of the Department for Local Government of the Romanian 
Cabinet (DAPL) we were able to collect 425 answers, and have a high rate 
of return of 71%. For reasons of inter-unit comparability, the Bucharest local 
governments were not included in our sample. 
What are the factors which explain attitudes and performance (the 
independent variables)? 
Different schools of thinking advanced and tested various 
explanatory models for the phenomena under scrutiny. We tried to 
summarize all these experiences and, following one of the mentioned 
studies, define four broad types of explanations for the variations in the 
dependent variables (see Swianiewicz et al., 1996). 
1. The environmental type, which sees the difference in outcome, 
performance, etc. as the result of different socio-economic conditions. 
Usually factors like the affluence and demographics of the citizens, the 
strength and structure of the economy, or the size of settlements are 
considered here. They are God-given, external factors if we take into 
consideration the normal possibility of control by the administration and 
therefore this kind of explanations are called environmental. All in all, they 
assume that the policy-makers' main concern are the challenges arisen from 
their environment and that they tend to give similar answers in similar 
circumstances. For the purpose of our study we measured two such 
indicators: 
 - the urban/rural type of municipality 
 - the number of inhabitants 
2. The partisan model, which takes into consideration the ideological 
affiliation of the mayors. Here we can expect to find classical left-right 
                                                                                                                  
were given greater scope for establishing the level of local taxes (among which the most 
important is the property tax) and revenues from the personal income tax are now shared 
between the local, county and central governments according to a transparent formula of 
40-10-50%. 
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differences in policy among  different ideological camps (tax-and-redistribute 
by the left, tax cuts and privatization by the right). In general, this model is 
reported to fit better the situation in continental Europe, where ideological 
cleavages tend to be more clear cut, while the environmental explanations 
are more suitable for USA, where party politics comes second to the local 
interests. In this study we defined the left-right affiliation of the mayors 
according to the results of our evaluation of the Romanian parliamentary 
parties (Aligica and Ionita, 1998). We believe this indirect assessment, 
which infers the parties’ left-right positions from the answers of their MPs to 
a free-market vs. interventionism questionnaire, portrays the political actors 
better than their official documents. 
3. The political culture model, which assumes that in a given locality or 
region there are underlying norms and values that shape the public 
behavior. They are persistent in time, shared by all the individuals or 
organizations across the political spectrum and do not depend directly on 
the socio-economic conditions. Hallmark studies like Almond and Verba 
(1963) or Putnam (1993) proved that such resilient patterns of attitude and 
behavior are not a fiction, though operationalizing and measuring them is 
not easy. In our study we decided to approximate the political culture 
through a geographical variable – i.e. the historical province of Romania 
where each locality belongs. This is a very imperfect approximation, of 
course, due to the lack of more precise data such as the territorial density of 
associations, political attitudes, etc. In the same time, we believe that it is 
not meaningless and may help to confirm (or infirm) an opinion widely 
spread nowadays that different parts of Romania inherited different political-
administrative traditions which did not vanished altogether during the five 
decades of uniform communist rule2. For the purpose of this study we 
defined eight historical regions, which correspond roughly with the eight 
Regions of Development EU-type (ARD) introduced four years ago in order 
to facilitate the implementation of regional policies in Romania.  
4. The cohort effect model, which simply looks at the role played by factors 
like age, gender, education or previous experience of the policy-makers. 
Studies like Inglehart (1990; pp. 66-83) show that newer, younger 
generations brought up in a different social climate and better educated, will 
have other policy preferences than their predecessors and display different 
patterns of behavior. However, it remains to be seen how (and if) this theory 
applies to the former communist countries, and whether the change of 
generations in local government, if real, brings about value shifts too. To 
                                         
2 The Northern and Western regions (Crisana, Ardeal and Banat) have been for many 
centuries either part, or in the area of influence, of the Hungarian Kingdom or Habsburg 
Monarchy, hence their slight Central European look. The Southern (Muntenia, Oltenia, 
Dobrogea) and Eastern (Moldova, Moldova South) parts of nowadays Romania are more 
Balkanic. They enjoyed a problematic and fluctuating status of autonomy from the Turkish or 
Russian empires before being unified in 1859, and becoming the independent Kingdom of 
Romania in 1880. The North-West was incorporated in 1918. 
  4 
measure the cohort effect we tested the effect of age, education and 
previous experience in the public administration. 
5. We begun the study with the four models mentioned; however, we ended 
up with a large residual which can only be explained by another 
independent variable. Let us call it the fiscal optimism of the mayors, as 
revealed by the answer to the question ‘When the new law of local budgets 
takes effect, do you think you will have more or less resources at your 
disposal?’. The structure of answers is given in Fig.1.  
30% more money
65% less money
5% don't know
 
Fig.1. Fiscal optimism 
It is absolutely surprising that the fiscal optimism of the Romanian 
mayors does not correlate with their demographics, party affiliation, 
environment or region, as one would have expected. After all, 
decentralization will make some communities better off and others worse off 
by reducing redistribution through central mechanisms. Municipalities with 
social and economic problems will see their revenues shrinking at a time 
when they are supposed to assume more responsibilities. It may be that the 
mayors do not realize this yet, or there might be other determinants of this 
attitude. But since the fiscal optimism does not correlate with any of the 
other independent variables, we can use it as a fifth explanatory factor.  
1. Budgetary strategies 
 Let us start by defining two intermediary dimensions: budgetary 
expansionism (‘how much should your budget be supplemented so that you 
are able to solve all your current problems?’); and activism (a score which 
shows how likely the mayors are to use active measures for increasing their 
budget – like raising taxes or user fees, selling assets, or contracting a loan, 
as opposed to asking for grants from the center, which is the typical passive 
attitude). The first dimension refers to the spending side of the local 
government activity, the second to the revenue collecting side. By 
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combining them we can construct a two by two matrix which defines four 
possible strategies of the local government officials: 
(i) Neoliberalism – reduce expenditure and rely on your own resources 
(ii) Welfarism – ‘tax-and-spend’ attitude 
(iii) Passive-realism – reduce expenditure and ask for help 
(iv) Passive-wishful thinking – expand the budget and ask for help 
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Fig. 2. Budgetary strategies 
 The high proportion of passive wishful thinkers among the Romanian 
mayors is in itself a matter of concern, given the general fiscal austerity 
imposed by the central government. If anything, it is more likely that the 
municipalities will get fiscal targets and caps on expenditure than extra 
grants from the center.  
Our purpose here is to explore which of the models put forward at the 
beginning correlate with the adoption of one strategy or another. After 
testing the correlations, it turns out that: 
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• The most influential factor is the fiscal optimism, as defined above 
(model no. 5). The more optimistic the mayors, the more likely they are 
to adopt active policies, whether neoliberal or welfarist. Among the 
optimists the proportion of activists and passive is almost the same, 
while among the pessimist the first less than one third. The fiscal 
optimism functions therefore as a good predictor for the active fiscal 
policies (Fig. 3). 
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Fig. 3. Fiscal optimism and active policies 
• A slightly weaker correlation is with the size of the locality, but only for 
the urban ones. While the size of a rural commune does not matter, 
there is a significant tendency of bigger towns to allow for more active 
policies and more conservative budget projections (Fig. 4).  
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Fig. 4. Average size of urban communities and strategies 
  7 
 
Conclusions: 
• The ideological affiliation is irrelevant for explaining policy options at the 
local level, but this should not come as a big surprise. Many researchers 
have noted that politics is less partisan and more interest-driven at the 
local than at the national level, not only in USA but also in the continental 
Europe (Ashford, 1990; Dente, 1990; Batley, 1991).  
• The cohort effect is also insignificant. It looks like age, education or the 
experience of a previous mandate do not make the mayors more skilled 
or assertive in managing their resources. 
• Nor do the region or the external environment (urban/rural) influence the 
choice of policies overall, which contradicts the common intuitions that, 
some regions being less developed historically or suffering from 
transition-induced economic depression, their local governments would 
be more tempted to yield to a culture of despair and helplessness. 
Moreover, the rural mayors seem to be at least as active and realist as 
the average. The only influence of the environment is felt within the 
urban category, bigger towns allowing for more active policies in the local 
government. If there are problems created by the external conditions, 
they are felt most acutely in small towns, which probably have to bear a 
disproportionate burden of economic restructuring by seeing their few 
industries closed down and the unemployment shooting up exactly when 
the tax collection and welfare support obligations are decentralized3.  
• The best predictor for the local government strategies is the fiscal 
optimism, the source of which is very difficult to identify. As we have 
already mentioned, it has nothing to do with the age, education or the 
previous experience of mayors, nor with the socio-economic 
environment, region or political affiliation. It predicts quite well if a mayor 
will pursue active or passive policies – i.e. if s/he relies on her own 
revenues or expects transfers from the central government. Fiscal 
optimism, as defined by the item in the questionnaire, is therefore the 
element which frames the local government attitudes towards resources. 
Mayors’ expectations, whether reasonable or not, contribute to the 
shaping of their frame of mind. The very fact that it does not correlate 
with the region and socio-economic environment shows that, at least in 
some cases, their expectations are utterly wrong.  
2. Institutional innovation 
  We constructed a composite indicator measuring institutional 
openness and change from the answers to the following questions: 
                                         
3 Jobs become very important for mayors under the new local finance law, since 40% of the 
personal income tax collected locally becomes revenue of the local government. 
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(a) Do you take part in any form of institutional cooperation with other 
Romanian local governments? 
(b) Since you took office did you change anything in the structure of 
your organization? 
(c) Do you have partnerships with the private sector? 
(d) Since you took office did you introduced a new local tax or did you 
identify any new sources of revenue? 
(e) Is welfare aid conditional on community work? 
Affirmative answers to these questions are considered signs of institutional 
activism and innovation. The indicator varies between 0 (lowest) and 5 
(highest); it was found to correlate with the environment, region and the 
mayor’s experience in office.  Institutional innovation depends 
significantly on the size and type of municipality, with big towns scoring 
highest (Fig. 5). The historical region also functions as a predictor for 
institutional innovation (Fig. 6), but only in three cases: Moldova South 
(2.35) on the one hand, Ardeal (3.4) and Banat (3.2) on the other. The other 
five regions are grouped around the average score of 2.95 with no 
significant differences among them.  
2.35
3.65
0 1 2 3 4 5
Rural
Urban
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35,001-100,000
over 100,000
 
Fig. 5. Institutional innovation score and the environment  
(urban/rural, size) 
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Fig. 6. Institutional innovation and historical regions 
 The incumbency effect is the weakest, the mayors on their second 
mandate being slightly more innovative (3.15, as compared to 2.85 for 
newcomers). But the significance of this correlation is questionable because 
two of the five questions give way to ambiguous interpretations: ‘Since you 
took office…’ could mean the whole period in office for the mayors with 
more than one mandate. 
If we split the innovation index into components, we find that the bulk 
of the variation occurs only on three of the five items: (a) cooperation with 
other local units, (b) internal structural change and (e) welfare aid 
conditionality. Joint ventures with the private sector (c) and the introduction 
of new local taxes (d) play no role in differentiating among regions or types 
of environment. This finding strengthens the results from paragraph 1, 
namely that whenever it comes to ‘hard’ budgetary issues (like c and d) 
activism is spread evenly across regions and types of environments 
(urban/rural) and does not correlate with the mayors’ ideological affiliation, 
demographics or experience in office. Therefore it is possible to refine the 
measurement by creating a new indicator of ‘pure’ (or ‘soft’) institutional 
activism only with the items (a), (b) and (e). The new indicator can only 
make the correlations even more robust.  
Conclusions:  
• Summing up, the urban local governments reform more their own 
structure and cooperate more with each other. The bigger the town, the 
more activity in this direction seems to take place. Which is small 
wonder: the local government is also bigger and there is more scope for 
institutional reforms and gains in efficiency. 
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• Historical regions determine the institutional reformism and cooperation, 
with Ardeal and Banat scoring highest. In the first case there might be a 
bias towards inter-municipality cooperation, since Ardeal concentrates 
most of the local governments held by UDMR. This political outlet of the 
Hungarian minority set up a forum of mayors and city councilors where 
each locality becomes automatically a member. However, it is unlikely 
that this bias explains entirely the high score of Ardeal4 – and even less 
so that of Banat, where the proportion of Hungarians is smaller. We can 
safely assume that a certain regional political culture, whatever its 
historical origin, makes the local governments more active and 
permeable to reform.  
• Nevertheless, it is important to note that this plus of activism and 
reformism is manifest only in the ‘soft’ areas of institutional design and 
cooperation with other units. When it comes to budgetary innovations 
and fiscal reform (‘hard’ issues) the regional political culture does not 
make any difference.  
3. Privatization of public services 
 Although theoretically part of the institutional reform of the local 
government, the privatization of the locally provided public services pose 
specific problems and call for different interpretations, so we discuss it 
separately. The mayors were asked if they regard the privatization as 
necessary, and if yes, whether what has been done by now in this respect is 
sufficient or not. The environment and the region explain some the 
differences in answers, yet the fiscal optimism is again the best predictor. 
 
                                         
4 The more so since on this score the Ardeal region has the lowest standard deviation, 
which shows that the inclination towards cooperation is not concentrated in the areas with 
Hungarian population but evenly distributed in territory. 
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Fig. 7. Privatization and the environment 
(urban/rural, size) 
 As we see, the urban mayors are more likely to find privatization 
necessary, which is natural since the rural communes have fewer assets to 
privatize. From this point of view it is surprising that the gap is not even 
larger. Probably the rural mayors in our sample did not have in mind their 
own locality only, but the desirability of privatization in general – which is still 
a good measure of their attitude. The size of the town is negatively 
correlated with the eagerness to privatize the local services. It looks like the 
mayors of small towns feel more intensely that these services are a burden 
and want to get rid of them. We’ll come back to this point bellow. 
Fiscal optimism is the strongest determinant of whether privatization 
is considered necessary, sufficient or none of these two (Fig. 8). The more 
optimistic mayors feel less need to speed up the privatization at the local 
level, while those who expect to lose from the new allocation mechanisms 
are more eager to relieve themselves of a supplementary burden. 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Pessim ism
Optim ism
Not necessary Sufficient Not sufficient
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Fig. 8. Privatization and fiscal optimism 
Conclusions: 
• The general view is that privatization of the local public services is 
desirable and should continue, opinion shared by the majority of the 
local governments. 
• Environment: the type of locality (urban/rural) influence the attitude 
towards privatization in a predictable way: since local governments of the 
rural communes have fewer assets to privatize, this issue is less salient 
for them. On the other hand, mayors of small towns display the most 
acute feeling that privatization should be sped up. 
• Fiscal pessimism and the small size of the town are the best predictors of 
a positive attitude towards privatization. It is very likely that the public 
services represent a disproportionate burden on small urban local 
governments, unable to continue to subsidize them when the earmarked 
grants from the center are terminated, or simply unwilling to bother with 
loss-making public companies (regii autonome) which cannot benefit 
from economies of scale. On the other hand, bigger urban municipalities 
with a more complex structure and more efficient public companies tend 
to regard these services as a possible source of income they do not 
want to give up5. Moreover, the allocation formulae for inter-
governmental ‘equilibration’ transfers seem to be biased in favor of the 
bigger and better-off municipalities – and these formula are based partly 
on the quantity of public services provided at the local level. It is 
understandable that some mayors are not happy to cancel off their 
budgets a component which either represents a net gain or at least help 
make the budget more ‘complex’ and less transparent. However, in spite 
of this trend, not all the mayors of big towns are against privatization – in 
fact, as the figures show, most of them are for privatization.  
4. Human resources 
We measured (a) the ratio of inhabitants to local government 
employees (positions in staff charts, irrespective of whether they are 
occupied or not) and (b) the proportion of vacant positions in the local 
government structure.  
On the first indicator we found only the expected positive correlation 
with the size of municipality (the bigger the community, the more inhabitants 
per local government staff will be – see Fig. 9), with a national average of 
about 400 and rural/urban averages of 365 and 445, respectively. None of 
the other variables related to environment, party affiliation, cohort and fiscal 
optimism introduce any variation in this pattern.  
                                         
5 For an analysis of how public companies can be used by the local government as a source 
of off-budget revenues, see Ionita and Fartusnic, 1999. 
  13 
0 200 400 600 800 1000
under 5,000
5,001-12,000
12,001-35,000
35,001-100,000
over 100,001
Inhabitants/LG employees
 
Fig. 9. Population per local government employee, by size of locality 
The result is remarkable in itself, showing that in spite of the 
expected budgetary constraints in worse-off regions or party affiliation, the 
local governments are reluctant to shed staff. This is true even if the look at 
the institutional activism defined in paragraph 2: even the mayors who 
pursued structural reforms in their apparatus seem to have found a way to 
do this without firing personnel. This result should be qualified for the big 
towns, however, where the number of cases is small and the standard 
deviation is high, so it is possible that some of the mayors of big towns did 
restructure their staff.  
The second indicator shows that the proportion of vacant positions is 
almost the same across regions, types of environment and budgetary 
expectations (12-16%). It is slightly higher in big urban local governments, 
which is understandable given the low salaries and the job alternatives 
available in big towns (Fig. 10). An exception from this pattern is the 
Dobrogea region, with an average of 24% vacancies and the highest 
standard deviation.  
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35,001-100,000
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Fig. 10. Vacant positions in local government (%), by size 
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It looks like the big municipalities, plus some localities in the 
Dobrogea region, find it particularly difficult to hire qualified people. The 
reasons may be different: availability of alternatives in the first case, 
isolation and extremely harsh conditions of living in the second (‘Danube 
Delta’ effect?). However, these are only suppositions. What is clear is that 
reducing positions in the local government is the last thing the mayors would 
do, even faced with severe budgetary constraints.  
5. Effectiveness in functioning and communication 
 We used a budgetary process score as a measure for how effectively 
the local government can perform their functions and communicate the 
results to the citizens. More precisely, this indicator aggregates the 
affirmative answers to the following three questions, and therefore varies 
between 0 (low effectiveness) and 3 (high effectiveness): 
- Did the local council approved the budget execution for the previous 
year? 
- Has the budgetary execution for the previous year been made 
public, according to the law? 
- Did the local council approved the budget for the current year? 
Meeting these requirements is not an extremely tall order: since our survey 
was conducted in May-June, many weeks after the budgetary process 
should have been completed, the answer to all three questions should 
normally be yes. Indeed, this was the case in about 70% municipalities, but 
it is exactly the deviations from the norm which are important. They are 
explained by only two factors: the size of the urban localities (Fig. 11) and 
the region (Fig. 12). 
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Fig. 11. Budgetary process score by size of town 
 Surprisingly, the rural communes do not perform worse than the 
urban ones, the average scores for the two types of localities being roughly 
the same. The size of the rural commune does not matter either. Which is 
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not the case with towns: the small ones seem to have problems in 
performing and communicating the results of the budgetary process.  
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Fig. 12. Budgetary process score by region 
 The regional institutional culture seems to be a fairly good predictor 
for this measure of institutional performance and confirm a well-known 
cliché: Banat and Transylvania score high and the Southern parts of the Old 
Kingdom score low.  
A second measure of effectiveness in institutional communication 
can be obtained by simply looking at the way our subjects responded to our 
inquiry6: from the first attempt; at the second request; or not at all. Here, 
again, the main explanatory factor is the regional political culture (Fig. 13). 
                                         
6 The questionnaire was self-administered, distributed by mail and a pre-paid envelope was 
enclosed. The only reasons for not responding were therefore to consider the survey as not 
so important or to postpone filling the questionnaire in until is lost or forgotten.  
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Fig. 13. Effective communication by region 
Banat and Transylvania (plus Dobrogea this time) score better than 
the average. The rest either do not respond at all, or do so only when they 
are approached a second time.  
There is also a weak correlation here with the type of environment, 
the rural mayors scoring lower on the communication indicator (Fig. 14).  
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Fig. 14. Effective communication by type of environment 
 The results presented in Fig.13 and 14 may raise the issue of 
adverse selection. In other words, those who are the least effective in 
communicating (and therefore do not respond) might perform below the 
average of their region or type of environment on other dimensions too – 
institutional innovation (2), privatization (3) or effectiveness of budgetary 
process (5). However, it is unlikely that this self-selection invalidates any of 
the previous results – if anything, it strengthens them, because the regions 
with the best rate of response perform always better on other indicators too. 
The ‘silent low performers’ are more numerous in low performing regions, so 
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that making them speak up would probably increase the observed 
differences between regions, in every instance when this variable matters. 
The same logic applies in the case of rural/urban self selection. 
6. Attitude towards corruption 
 The mayors were asked (a) if they think that there are corrupt civil 
servants in their local governments, and (b) if there have been cases of 
corruption exposed and measures taken against the persons found guilty 
since they took office. By aggregating the answers we obtain a score 
between 0 (no corruption reported, no measures) and 2 (there is corruption, 
some cases were made public and the perpetrators punished).  
 There are two alternative interpretations for a situation when no 
corruption is reported:  
(i) That there is no corruption in that particular institution. If the 
answers are taken at face value, it must then be explained what 
makes some local governments less (or more) corrupt than others. In 
terms of our models the only plausible explanations may have to do 
with environment (bigger towns and larger budgets provide more 
possibilities for embezzlement, better protection through anonymity 
and higher demand for ‘corrupt services’ from the clients) or the 
regional institutional culture (by tradition, some regions are ‘more 
corrupt’ than others).  
(ii) The respondents are not willing to admit and confront this problem. 
The second interpretation takes the affirmative answers as a signal 
that, for some reasons, some respondents are more inclined than 
others to uncover and fight corruption in their institution. This attitude 
ought to be explained. 
The first interpretation (environmental) seems to be validated to 
some extent. Corruption is more frequently reported in big urban local 
governments (Fig. 15). Almost 75% of the cities with population over 
100,000 admit facing this problem, and 25% of those bigger than 35,000 
exposed and punished corrupt civil servants. 
However, the is no regional effect, which contradicts a very 
widespread belief that the Northern and Western parts of Romania are more 
‘institutionally clean’ than the others.  
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Fig. 15. Environment type and corruption scores 
 
 The second interpretation is also supported by data. There is a 
significant correlation between the number of cases reported and the 
political affiliation: right-wing mayors report corruption more often (Fig. 16). 
Which means, according to our hypothesis, that they are less tolerant 
toward it. It is unlikely that the party membership of the mayors caused the 
observed corruption in their institutions. Rather, there is every reason to 
believe that corruption, deeply rooted in the institutional culture of the local 
governments, pre-dated the mandate of the current mayors and thus is 
independent of their political ideology. If there is no direct causation, the 
observed difference must then come from the willingness to admit it. All the 
more so since, if a mayor would have been particularly effective in exposing 
and combating corruption during his mandate and thus decreased 
significantly its occurrence (negative causation), he would have probably 
reported the cases in our survey – after all, this is a measure of his success. 
All in all, we find no explanation for the correlation displayed in Fig.16 other 
than the less tolerant attitude towards corruption of the mayors from rightist 
parties. 
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Fig. 16. Ideology and the fight against corruption 
It is difficult to disentangle the two types of explanations, (i) and (ii), 
since the rightist parties tend also to have more urban mayors than the 
leftist ones. Our sample does not allow a good analysis of the ideology 
effect by controlling for the type and size of locality. Nevertheless, Fig. 15 
and 16 show that the intolerance of corruption correlates stronger with the 
ideology than the environment type (urban/rural), which suggests that the 
first may be the real explanatory factor.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
  Environment  Party Region Cohort Fiscal  
 Size Urban/rural    optimism 
1. Strategies ↑     ⇑ 
2. Institutional 
innovation 
↑ ↑  ↑   
3. Privatization ⇓ ↑    ↓ 
4. Human resources ↑      
5. Effectiveness, 
communication 
↑   ⇑   
6. Corruption ↑ ↑     
   ⇑    
↑ Correlation;  ⇑ Strong correlation;       ⇓ Strong negative correlation    
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The table above summarizes our findings. 
• As we see, the cohort effect must be rejected for all the dimensions 
under scrutiny. Younger or better educated mayors do not make any 
difference when it comes to resource management, institutional 
innovation, effectiveness or good communication. Nor does the 
experience of a previous mandate help much. This is bad omens for the 
optimistic theory of generation change and shows that other factors than 
the mere demographics of the political representatives should be taken 
into consideration if a real reform of the political class is the pursued 
goal. 
• The ideological affiliation of the mayors makes no difference for the 
budgetary and privatization policies, institutional change or human 
resource management, which confirms the view that local politics is less 
partisan that national politics. The only area where party matters is 
corruption, which seems to be tolerated less by the right wing mayors. 
Our results support the conclusion that in countries with a fuzzy political 
cleavages, which is the case in Romania if look at the parties’ economic 
views, the local policy is not influenced by ideology (Swianiewicz et 
al,1996; Robinson,1963).  
• The region, used here as a proxy for political culture, explains well the 
‘soft’ institutional innovation and the effectiveness in functioning and 
communicating. Transylvania and Banat score high on every such 
indicator, with Moldova South performing worst, followed by Oltenia and 
Muntenia. However, all these differences disappear when it comes to the 
‘hard’ budgetary strategies. It seems that there is indeed an institutional 
culture in Banat and Transylvania which help the local governments 
organize themselves, follow procedures and communicate better; but 
this does not make them more creative and assertive in managing 
resources too. Surprisingly, corruption  is no less frequent in some 
regions than others. 
• Environment matters, but more by the size of municipality than by the 
rural-urban cleavage. The village mayors score slightly poorer at 
communicating and institutional innovation. But the real problem in 
Romania lays at the level of small town local governments: they are not 
able to reform, are late with the budgetary procedures, have problems 
with inter-institutional communication and are passive wishful thinkers 
when it comes to financial resources. Here, more than in many villages, 
there is a real disproportion between means and needs, and the 
situation can only worsen as the decentralization goes on. Their strong 
willingness to privatize the local public services appears to be a 
desperate attempt to get rid of a burden rather than an active policy of 
restructuring and increasing revenues. The only problems discernible in 
big towns face are corruption – determined, we believe, by the increased 
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number of opportunities and higher stakes – and a shortage of qualified 
personnel due to better job alternatives available on the market. 
• Fiscal optimism is an ad-hoc explanatory factor which we identified 
during this research. It probably depends on the ‘perceived environment’ 
more than on the real conditions the local governments are going to face 
under the new law of local budgets. If so, its effect may weaken once the 
mayors gain experience and adjust their expectations to the real fiscal 
environment. But this can also be a measure of the person’s skills and 
determination to cope with the new situation, in which case it is exactly 
one of the things we were looking for. It does not correlate with the 
mayors’ demographics, political affiliation or environment and seems to 
be evenly distributed in territory. It influences positively the activism of 
the budgetary policy, which leads to the optimist conclusion that there is 
room for personal intervention and improvement in spite of the adverse 
external conditions7. And it correlates negatively with the willingness to 
privatize the local public services, which shows that they are still 
perceived as a source of revenues. 
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